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This article examines labour relations in Central Asia’s oil and gas
TNCs, contributing to recent debates on the Global Union Federa-
tions’ and national unions’ roles in building an ‘emerging global
industrial relations framework’ (Papadakis, Casale, & Tsotroudi,
2008) or ‘global system of industrial relations’ (Fairbrother and
Hammer, 2005). These tend to use ‘conventional’ unions from the
European, American and Japanese traditions as their default model
of trade unionism.
Otherwise excellent research on Central Asian politics and
society almost completely ignores labour and employment issues
(Collins, 2006). Very little research has been published on labour in
these countries (for a marginal exception, see Borisov & Clarke,
2011). However their extractive industries play a major role in
supplying oil, gas and minerals to industry internationally and are
therefore skey to capitalism’s operation. They are also signiﬁcant to
the Global Union Federation the International Federation of
Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions: ICEM),
now part of Industriall. The ICEM, along with other GUFs, has
focused for many years on establishing bargaining relationships
with Trans-National Corporations (TNCs) globally we contribute to
debates about how GUFs and national unions seek to advance
workers’ interests in TNCs from this standpoint. ICEM/Industriall,
in common with other Global Union Federations, focuses its
strategy on TNCs (Platzer & Mu¨ller, 2009).* Tel.: +44 2084115159.
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4.0/).The article is structured as follows. We begin by outlining the
regional context. Next, we introduce the globalisation debate
among industrial relations scholars, developing our research
question and explaining our method. Next, we examine the
Central Asian unions and their relations with the GUFs, with
special reference to Kazakhstan. We then discuss the 2011 revolt in
the oil and gas industry and the unions’ role in it. We conclude by
revisiting our research question and crystallising our contribution
to the debate on the role of GUFs and national unions in relation to
TNCs.
2. Regional context
The Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are key locations for
extractive TNCs. From the early 1990s almost every large oil and
gas company moved into the region. The overall stock of foreign
direct investment (FDI) in Central Asia increased from USD 1.435
million in 1992 to USD 119.279 million in 2011. Most of this went
to Kazakhstan (78.49% in 2011) (UNCTAD, 2012). Kazakhstan’s
principal exports are oil and natural gas, long responsible for
almost half of the country’s foreign earnings (Kaser & Mehrotra,
1992; Rittmann, 2012).
The Kazakh trade unions are deﬁned by the society they belong
to. The Central Asian states’ industries were ruled in Soviet times
by a relatively devolved form of hierarchy; interpersonal and
patrimonial relations persisted after their relatively late secession
from the USSR (Cooley, 2005). Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbaev
follows a policy similar to that of other elites on the ‘transitionale under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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that has extended to trade unions.
A common feature of Central Asian polities has been ‘the
establishment of super-presidential political systems under
autocratic rulers’ (Pomfret, 2012:400). Government structures in
the region have been dominated since independence by repre-
sentatives of the Soviet elite (Sievers, 2013; Gleason, 2003;
Murphy, 2006; Lane, 1996; Lasch & Dana, 2011). In the Kazakh
case, traditional patrimonial relations also provided both social
foundations and a means of legitimation for the new regime.
Currently, as Minbaeva, Hutchings, and Thompson (2007) illus-
trate, Kazakhstan (like the region’s other countries) exhibits a
culture where the family unit and local origins are crucial.
Clientilism, associated with clan politics, deepened in the 1990s
(Schatz, 2004). The political elites maintain strong economic and
social connections to powerful local clans and oligarchic groupings.
Clans have played a central role in post-independence Central Asia,
and it has been argued by Collins (2006) that they are also responsible
for the region’s failure to maintain the public goods provided by the
Soviet regime while advancing their private interests. Clans are
informal, vertical, kinship-based, informal organisations. They
provided a means of reconstituting political and social relations
during and beyond the fall of Communism in ways that became
increasingly inimical to the interests of labour. They are signiﬁcant in
the increasingly strong industrial lobbies calling for labour market
de-regulation supported by business elites in Kazakhstan and
Kyrgzstan but also have links into the trade unions.
Labour law is embedded in this wider system of social relations;
the weakness of impersonal rules in employment relations is
evident. O˝zkan suggests that faced by problems, instead of going to
the courts Uzbek business people ‘would seek the help and advice
of their inﬂuential and powerful relatives and friends’ (O¨zkan,
2010:83). According to Transparency International’s Annual
Corruption Report (2012), Central Asian countries continue to
occupy low positions in the control of corruption, rule of law and
judicial independence indices. Moreover, unions’ legal rights
steadily diminished during ‘transition’. In Kazakhstan, a 2000
revision of the Labour Code shifted employment relations to an
essentially individual basis by making only individual contracts
mandatory; collective agreements at all levels were from this point
voluntary. Unions retained the right to prevent the termination of
an individual’s contract revoked (ICTUR, 2005). Parliament is at the
time of writing considering further restrictions both on civil
liberties in general, such as the right of assembly, marches and
freedom of expression; simultaneously, the new trade union law
prohibits such activities as enterprise unions or the basic level of
union organisation by organisations without nation-wide status
(Buketov, 2014). In short, enterprise unions (which may poten-
tially lead industrial action) are subordinated to national
organisations (which are more subject to political inﬂuence).
Thus, labour law has been continuously weakened although unions
continue to resist these changes (Buketov, 2014).
Employees themselves are not in a position to assert their
rights. Good employment opportunities are few and far between,
the ‘informal economy’ is the normal locus for populations’ battle
for survival, employment laws are rarely enforced and work with
TNCs is widely seen as a privilege (Muratbekova-Touron, 2002).
Exceptionally hierarchical and authoritarian management styles
are generally unchallenged (Muratbekova-Touron, 2002). In larger
companies, decision-making is concentrated among major share-
holders and other stakeholders’ interests are largely ignored
(Minbaeva et al., 2007). In short, employees have very little power.
For those physically capable of the work, exit to foreign countries,
notably to Russian construction sites, represent relatively attrac-
tive options despite the racial discrimination they are likely to
experience (Zayonchkovskaya, 2009).In the oil and gas industries, labour confronts sophisticated
internationally-coordinated employers in which local states have
major interests. Local political elites were highly reluctant to let
foreign companies acquire too much control over local natural
resources and promoted ethnic nationalism and associated
‘resource nationalism’ (Bingol, 2004:44; see also Murphy, 2006
for a more detailed analysis of the Kazakhstani elite). On the other
hand, they required foreign companies’ technical expertise if
resources were to be fully exploited. They therefore pushed foreign
companies to establish joint ventures with state-controlled or
quasi-privatised companies, conglomerates and holding compa-
nies. Governments are represented in these ventures by state-
owned companies or government holdings. In Kazakhstan, many
foreign investment projects in extractive industries are conducted
through joint ventures with state-owned agencies (KMG Explora-
tion and Productions; KazMunaiTengiz, KazTransGaz, and Kaz-
TransOil), arms of the state-owned natural gas and oil company
KMG. IJVs are often favoured by developing countries, but Kazakh
policy is more stringent than in China, where although the
government does not permit wholly-owned foreign company
subsidiaries and IJVs are often used, alternative arrangements are
more common. The Kazakh state scrutinises applications for TNC
investment closely and is interventionist in its approach (Molda-
sheva, 2001). On occasion, national elite interests may occasionally
coincide with those of unions in which case government may act in
their defence, thereby strengthening the latters’ emphasis on
political action. Yet these IJVs have had long lives, and as our
evidence below indicates, the effect is to provide access to local
expertise in handling labour relations, thereby strengthening
company positions.
In summary, the social, political and legal pressures on Kazakh
trade unions have increased since independence, while they face
powerful TNCs. These two factors have increased their interest in
the international level of trade unionism.
2.1. The debate on GUFs, national unions and relations with TNCs
It was argued almost a decade ago that the GUFs were central
actors in the construction of a global system of industrial relations
(Fairbrother and Hammer, 2005). From this perspective, the Global
Unions were key to inﬂuencing TNCs’ activities in worker-friendly
directions, notably through formal agreements with them. Other
researchers have increasingly located this form of regulation in the
wider context of other ‘private’ initiatives; those by campaigning
NGOs and employer-led ‘CSR’ bodies on the one hand, ‘public’
regulation by international organisations such as the International
Labour Organisation (ILO) and national governments on the other.
This school tends to assign the GUFs only a minor role (Kolben,
2007). These various forms of regulation may operate in
complementary and positive ways or, as other researchers have
noted, condition a wide range of different outcomes, not all of them
positive for workers (Locke, Rissing, & Pal, 2013). We mentioned
deteriorating labour law application in Kazakhstan. If the GUFs and
national trade unions play only marginal roles, labour regulation is
likely to be extremely weak since it will reﬂect low levels of
regulation in both spheres, necessarily creating few complemen-
tarities between them. In our case, the Kazakh unions are aware of
this and wish for international intervention to support their weak
position.
It has been suggested that Global Union Federations may exert
inﬂuence on TNCs in various ways. There has been growing interest
in the conclusion by GUFs of agreements with TNCs variously
described as International (or alternatively, Global) Framework
Agreements. These are essentially repetitions of certain core ILO
standards, notably those in favour of freedom of association and
collective bargaining together with undertakings that companies
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within these agreements precedence is normally given to local law,
the enforcement of rights can be difﬁcult if not impossible,
undermining claims that IFAs can constitute effective tools in
securing employees’ positions. Unions operating beyond simple
‘legal watchdog’ functions (a strong tradition in Kazakh unions) is
therefore very relevant. Others prefer to view the agreements in a
wider context of dialogue between GUFs and TNCs; their purpose is
to allow local unionists to organise and bargain while GUFs ‘hold
the ring’ for them through dialogue with companies drawing on
TNCs’ need for international legitimacy and not simply national
law (Croucher & Cotton, 2011). Nevertheless, despite reservations,
these agreements continue to be viewed positively by all of the
industrial relations scholars cited, as providing local unions with
opportunities to organise within signatory companies. Indeed it
has been argued that their importance has even been understated.
From this perspective, if unions can leverage issues of greater
importance to TNCs such as product or service quality, labour
issues can acquire increased salience with them and greater gains
can be achieved for workers (Williams, Davies, & Chinguno, 2013).
Thus, the clear consensus is that IFAs and indeed wider dialogue
with TNCs are opportunities for local activists to negotiate with
TNCs and organise workers to put pressure on them. This assumes
that local unions have orientations and structures that permit
them to do this.
How GUFs can assist local unions to organise within TNCs and
bargain effectively with them has also been discussed. Some
researchers have stressed the signiﬁcance of internal GUF and
union relations in determining IFAs’ effectiveness (Dehnen, 2013).
Power relations between unions operating in the global heartlands
of trade unionism, especially in Europe, and the relatively
resource-poor GUFs, can assume major signiﬁcance. European
trade unions, when operating in conjunction with others in
European Works Councils, have occasionally sought to extend their
inﬂuence both with TNCs and the GUFs themselves, in the ways
that they have negotiated IFAs with companies (Dehnen, 2013).
The GUFs, as advocates and guardians of global trade unionism and
industrial relations more widely, have historically sought to
address power imbalances within the international trade union
movement. However, these imbalances are also reﬂected in the
GUFs: their structures favour the unions of the developed world
who contribute most to their funding and governance (Croucher &
Cotton, 2011). The GUFs have addressed this tension through
educational activities designed to share information, transfer
expertise and build trans-national solidarity. Long-term workers’
educational activities, designed to build international and indeed
national organizing, mobilising and negotiating capacities, have
proved effective both within and beyond the Russian-speaking
world (Croucher, 2004; Sogge, 2004; Cotton & Royle, 2014).
However, a consideration stressed by Croucher and Cotton (2011)
is vital here: a resource-based view of GUFs’ capacities strongly
suggests that they have to decide where to put their limited
resources. These decisions will be informed by the amount of
progress they are likely to make in any given international
context.
Thus, the debates surrounding the construction of a ‘global
system’ generate questions about the extent to which GUFs are
major players within it, the effectiveness of IFAs and internal
relations within the international trade union movement. Kazakh-
stan is a suitable context for examining them precisely because it
raises the question of whether GUF inﬂuence may have signiﬁcant
limits in certain places, due to the speciﬁc nature of trade unionism
there. Recent literature documents international union efforts to
improve organising and bargaining capacities. Yet, in global terms,
the ‘varieties of unionism’ (Frege & Kelly, 2005) are not limited to
those of Europe and the Anglo-Saxon world, nor to those withsigniﬁcant organising and collective bargaining orientations which
attract almost exclusive attention in the ‘union renewal’ discourse.
Previous accounts of Kazakh trade unionism have insufﬁciently
located them within the context of their society; nor have they
taken full account of the importance of their Soviet legacy nature
(see for example Van Klaveren, Tijdens, Hughie-Williams, & Ramos
Martin, 2010; ICTUR, 2005).
The Federation of Trade Unions (FPRK), Kazakhstan’s majority
trade union confederation, to which many industrial union
federations afﬁliate, is the largest and most important confederation.
It does not provide consistent statistics for its membership since it
has only unreliable data from afﬁliates. Van Klaveren et al. (2010)
estimate that overall, 50% of paid workers are unionised, although
ICTUR (2005) offered a much lower estimate and membership has
undoubtedly been falling recently in many industries (Van Klaveren
et al., 2010). In the oil, gas and chemical industries Industriall’s
afﬁliated unions Kazhimprofsoyuz (chemicals) and Kazneftegaz-
profsoyuz (oil and gas) are agreed by our respondents to have
relatively high levels of union membership. A number of small
independent unions also exist but are marginalised by ofﬁcial unions
and management. Indeed, an internal ICEM document of 2000
(ICEM, 2000) reported that the Kazakh union leaders erroneously
viewed changes to labour law mooted in 1999 as aimed at their
independent rivals and were therefore complacent about them.
The ofﬁcial Kazakh unions share many characteristics of other
unions in the Russian region, but are organisationally and
culturally relatively ‘unreformed’ and remain close to – sometimes
almost indistinguishable from – the Soviet model. Russian unions
made very uneven but considerable changes from 1990 onwards
(Sogge, 2004). The Global Union Federations have been concerned
since the beginning of transition to improve the situation in Central
Asia by making all unions capable of taking an organising rather
than a servicing approach.
In this context, we ask: How did the ICEM perceive and impact
oil and gas workers unions’ capacities to represent workers in TNCs
operating in Kazakhstan?
3. Method
In so far as the research involved direct investigation of the
Kazakh unions and of their relations with the GUFs, the method was
participant observation. The author was involved as an educator
with the ICEM, IUF and other GUFs from 1995 until 2010 and was
involved in project planning, investigations into unions and
conducting numerous workshops both in Russia and Central Asia.
He draws here on extensive diaries of the preparation, implemen-
tation and evaluation of workshop events and their impact on
unions across the ﬁfteen year period. In Central Asia, involvement in
these activities reached a peak in 2004–2006. Although this is
relatively long for a research project and considerable change might
be expected during it, the main changes were contextual and the
overall story was one of organisational stasis. The author also had
regular discussion with GUF ofﬁcials at all levels from General
Secretary downwards and access to extensive documentation on
GUF strategy and local union structures. These documents provide
unique insights into GUF perceptions of the unions.
English and Russian language literature and government,
company and NGO websites, were also used, supplemented by
notes on interviews conducted by the author in 2006. Fifteen semi-
structured interviews were carried out to deepen our data on the
Central Asian unions. Respondents were selected to offer a wider
view of the unions and the context in which they operated. Three
interviews were with Kazakh government ofﬁcials, four with
company representatives from major extractive companies and
the remainder with national trade union ofﬁcers and ofﬁcials of all
of the Global Union Federations involved in the Six GUFs project
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(the latter with the assistance of an experienced Russian trade
union interpreter who was very familiar with the national, union
and GUF contexts) and recorded exclusively by written notes at
respondent request.
3.1. Kazakh Trade Unions and the ICEM
In this section, we base our analysis on GUF documents, ICEM
and other respondents’ views of the unions, supplementing them
by other sources.
An internal ICEM document produced by a highly experienced
expert had summed up the situation in Kazakhstan in 2000. This
conﬁdential and perceptive strategy statement (ICEM, 2000) is
worth quoting in extenso because of its author’s insight and
intimate acquaintance with the unions concerned. It began by
describing the need to reform these unions as ‘the most vital
necessity’ because of the local importance of TNCs and the high
level of Western interest and management methods in the country,
noting that some leaders and activists already saw the need for
change. As GUF respondents later noted, the many older leaders
with short personal time horizons feared retaliation from employ-
ers if they signalled less conciliatory, organising and bargaining
approaches. The document proceeded to describe internal union
ﬁnancial arrangements and their consequences:
‘The bulk of the dues remain in the hands of the local
organisations which use them for so-called ‘material assistance’
(when somebody is asking for some money for kids, to buy
goods or for the funeral etc.). . .Local organisations do not have
real motives to recruit more members, as they will have slightly
more money, but progressively more headache. . .’
Therefore, the author argued, enterprise organisations had
little reason to afﬁliate to the national union federation at all. In
the context of their common lack of bargaining function, this
increased their vulnerability to company inﬂuence and to their
becoming, in local parlance ‘yellow unions’ or employer-driven
bodies. It also created the possibility of increasingly prevalent
‘yellow unions’ linking up or, as the document put it, ‘creation of
the company unions under the name of interregional. . .and even
international. . .’ Thus, companies sought not to abolish ofﬁcial
unions as these had legal status and may act to ‘block the
development of independent unions which although few and
small are also very active’.
The same ICEM internal document proceeded to show in detail
how the process of developing company unions by separating
them from the national unions applied in the Kazakh instance. The
TengizChevroil Company signed a collective agreement with three
of its unions in 1999, at least two of which were company unions in
the author’s view. This consolidated the local enterprise unions’
internal company positions and marginalised other union levels,
threatening the disintegration of the national union. In other cases,
‘Western companies not capable of directly organising yellow
unions try to undermine relations and connections between the
local unions and their regional and national ofﬁces (Chevron in
Kazakhstan). (parentheses in original—author)’ (Ibid.). The quota-
tion shows how Western companies have insufﬁcient local
knowledge and networks to adopt sophisticated and well-tailored
solutions to problems and therefore potentially beneﬁt from IJVs.
All of our GUF respondents agreed that this picture was
essentially still accurate ﬁve years later. The Kazakh unions had
discussed change, but had taken few steps towards it, essentially
remaining Soviet-style unions with top-down bureaucratic struc-
tures reliant on management patronage. They nevertheless had
strong political orientations and a clear view of the need to
represent Kazakh workers’ interests in relation to government andTNCs. On a few occasions, enterprise unions had shown some
capacity to bargain, an assessment conﬁrmed by our company
respondents. Equally, all agreed that the unions essentially saw a
need to become more representative bodies with greater capacity
to involve, represent and mobilise members. Nevertheless, the
FPRK union leaders were often from Soviet times when leaders
were appointed by the party and their three basic functions
therefore continued to be seen as: ﬁrst, government-oriented
political action (including through national tripartite structures),
second, legal watchdog functions and third, worker welfare
through the direct distribution of ‘material support’ to workers
in particular need at workplace level. The unions claimed some
gains for workers by 2005, notably improved health and safety
insurance laws and improved disbursements to people injured at
work. These gains, however, were marginal for most workers. The
many legal cases brought against foreign companies for refusing to
sign collective agreements brought only patchy results.
Members’ subscriptions were largely retained at enterprise
level with only relatively small amounts being (inconsistently)
sent to regional and national levels, leading to high levels of
disarticulation between different union levels and the considerable
isolation of many workplace organisations. At all levels, collective
agreements could be reached. These are normally legalistic
documents which take formulaic and declaratory forms and are
not underpinned by meaningful bargaining or substantial moni-
toring processes. Often the collective agreements at enterprise
level were (and continue to be) concluded by non-union bodies.
One result is that at most foreign enterprises, no collective
agreements existed and where they did they were not concluded
by independent unions; an internal GUF report ascribed this
situation to an unprincipled and over-conciliatory stance by union
leaders taken to preserve their weak positions with management
(ICEM, 2006). However, the Kazakh oil workers’ union had shown
some local capacity to bargain and to access the ICEM’s assistance.
In 2005 the ICEM had successfully supported Kazakh negotiators in
dealing with recalcitrant Canadian management in Petrokazakh-
stan by organising a solidarity demonstration in Windsor Canada,
bringing pay increases. GUF respondents argued that success was
achieved because the Canadians were by this point out of favour
with the Kazakh state-owned companies. They were soon replaced
by Chinese partners. Thus, the circumstances were unusually
favourable to the union.
The conclusion of a Global Framework Agreement between the
Russian Oil and Gas Workers’ Union (ROGWU) and the Russian oil
major Lukoil might have signalled the beginnings of change. Yet in
global terms, this is not a ‘typical’ GFA. Lukoil management,
together with union leadership in Russia, (Russian Oil and Gas
Workers’ Union—ROGWU) was happy to sign a Global Framework
Agreement in 2004. Although ROGWU had made only limited
structural changes since Perestroika. The Russian e´lite exercises
considerable inﬂuence in Lukoil as in all natural resources
companies, while the union has representation at the highest
level within the company: this is a company-level manifestation of
‘‘illusory corporatism’ (Ost, 2000). Even before the Global
Framework Agreement with ROGWU, the company (along with
Yukos) created a regional association between the Russian and
Central Asian unions, which ‘unfortunately looks very attractive in
the eyes of the ambitious local and regional ofﬁcers. . .’ (ICEM,
2000). The GFA, signed some ﬁve years later, extended existing
Russian ‘social partnership’ arrangements between ROGWU and
Lukoil to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. It was reported by GUF
respondents to have underpinned ROGWU’s position in the ICEM
and its inﬂuence with its Central Asian counterparts. The
agreement was, at least in formal terms, relatively advanced,
containing a clause binding the company to adhere to it wherever
it had ‘full control’; elsewhere it would simply ‘exercise its best
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secure compliance. The IJV is arguably a case where the company
lacks full control. GUF respondents argued that it recalled
traditional Soviet-style industrial relations to Central Asian units.
It arguably decreased the ICEM’s inﬂuence on the unions as the
company showed its willingness to ‘substitute’ for the GUF by
providing cross-border contact and foreign travel. Thus, far from
creating possibilities for Central Asian unions to become more
independent, it reduced them. Thus, neither the joint action
against the Canadians nor the Lukoil GFA were seen by the ICEM as
changing the overall picture.
3.2. The GUFs’ reform efforts in Central Asia
In this section, we use the author’s notes on his involvement
with GUF activities, supplemented by other named sources. The
Global Union Federations and in particular the ICEM, had been in
contact with Central Asian unions from the early 1990s onwards,
becoming well-informed about their structures and activities.
From 1994, funded by the Dutch FNV Mondiaal, the ICEM and IUF –
traditional partner GUFs because of the lack of overlap and hence
competition between their afﬁliates’ membership bases –
launched educational activities in Eastern Europe. These were
designed to assist unions to restructure to cope with major change.
Central Asian unions were consciously relegated to a future in
which Eastern Europe and then Russia and Ukraine had been
essentially dealt with. For the GUFs, unions needed to be ready to
undertake reform; despite some demand from afﬁliates and indeed
non-afﬁliates, the GUFs made careful judgements both collectively
and individually about which unions should be invited to become
involved.
The central Asian unions had only marginal involvement in a
major four-year effort by the international trade union movement
to facilitate union re-structuring in the Russian-speaking world
begun in 2004. The Global Union Federations judged them to be
insufﬁciently capable of reform to merit full access to the project’s
resources. This initiative was conducted by six (originally ﬁve)
Global Union Federations led by the ICEM and IUF – the ﬁrst time in
their long history that so many GUFs had co-operated in this way –
and was designed to consolidate tentative changes made over the
previous decade (Sogge, 2004). Central Asian and Kazakhstani
unions had some small involvement but this was limited to
creating a cadre of union educators. The educational work was to
use the collective learning methods described in detail in Croucher
and Cotton (2011) to identify and solve members’ problems by
involving them. They drew on a handbook created by Moldovan
union educators (‘The union: past, present and future’) designed to
allow unions to locate themselves within an evolutionary process
transforming Soviet-style unions.
The accuracy of ICEM perceptions of unions was tested through
the educational project. During a project workshop involving the
Kazakh unions held in 2007, senior union ofﬁcials were asked to
apply an organisational analysis tool to their unions. All ofﬁcials
saw a need for change. They also drew attention to an important
basis on which they argued the existing form of unionism rested:
older workers’ expectations of appropriate union functions,
notably offering material assistance and legal aid. Asked to identify
ways in which they might change, their prescriptions were
generally compatible with existing modus operandi and cultures.
They called for ‘competent, well-trained leaders’ and ‘better
information about companies’. Their expressed desire for im-
proved educational systems and increased educational resources
begged the question of the nature of that education, their
traditional educational activity having been limited to top-down
information giving. There were also general calls for the existing
structures to be re-organised and for members’ subscriptions to beallocated in different ways. Conceptions of a more ‘organising’
approach introduced by GUF participants were received with
interest. However, it was also noticeable that these ideas were not
explored by participants. Several participants said they needed
time to think through their applicability to the Central Asian
context (author’s notes of workshop held in Bishkek, March 2007).
This tended to support ICEM perceptions of the unions as unlikely
to reform soon.
The educational and organisational processes undertaken by
the GUFs in Russia and Ukraine have been judged by external
bodies, including the Federation of European Employers, to have
considerably improved matters among Russian and Ukrainian
unions (Croucher & Cotton, 2011). By contrast, in the case of the
central Asian unions, another internal document produced for all
six GUFs argued that ‘There is a number of speciﬁc problems (sic) in
the region of Central Asia that are inherent only to this region.
These include obsolete and out-of-date union structures, on the
one hand, and lack of trade union culture, on the other. . .trade
unions are often unable to act promptly and adequately to the
changes (sic). . .’ (Six GUFs, 2008). In the subsequent GUF project in
the Russian-speaking world, designed to create and upgrade
networks of activists in TNCs, activists from the Kazakh unions
were only marginally involved.
3.3. The Kazakh unions and the 2011 labour revolt in oil and gas
Here, detailed publications on the labour revolt of 2011 are our
primary source. Kazakh unions have remained largely unreformed
and did not lead signiﬁcant industrial conﬂicts in 2011. In that year,
a dramatic revolt occurred in an unprecedented wave of strikes in
oil facilities in Western Kazakhstan. These included a seven
month-long strike involving thousands of workers over low pay in
KarazhanbasMunai, a Kazakh–Chinese joint venture in the Kazakh
oil industry. Their low pay reﬂected a lack of effective collective
bargaining (Rittmann, 2012). The strikes were led by small
independent trade unions and unofﬁcial leaders, ignored by
companies. Numerous violations of workers’ and trade union
rights supposedly guaranteed by national law were documented
by Human Rights Watch (Rittmann, 2012). On 16 December, 2011,
twelve people were shot dead and many others wounded when
police opened ﬁre on strikers. According to the senior IUF ofﬁcial
Kirill Buketov, the strikes marked a turning point in Kazakh
employment relations in that violent and unlawful repression had
become the norm rather than the exception. The government
sentenced a number of strike leaders to imprisonment and other
penalties, for ‘promoting social unrest’ (Rotmann & Williamson,
2012). The opposition politician Vladimir Lozlov was tried for his
involvement; it is signiﬁcant that a politician rather than a union
leader was singled out in this way. The government clearly
identiﬁed essentially ‘unofﬁcial’ strike leaders and an outside
politician rather than the ofﬁcial trade unionists as responsible for
leading the unrest. Three TNCs involved in IJVs were judged by
Human Rights Watch to have denied workers’ rights in many
areas; some two thousand workers were dismissed for participat-
ing in the strikes (Rittmann, 2012; Buketov, 2014). The strike
demonstrated the contours of the national situation in the oil and
gas industry: unprecedented worker unrest was insufﬁciently
well-articulated and represented by the formal institutions of
employee representation. The Russian trade unions and indeed the
international trade union movement more widely expressed
dissatisfaction with the ofﬁcial Kazakh unions’ conduct during
the strike. The President of the Russian Confederation of Labour
Boris Kravchenko spoke critically of them in Western Europe and
was supported by others when he suggested publicly that the
striking oil workers had been left without any support by the
Kazakh national unions (Rittmann, 2012).
R. Croucher / International Business Review 24 (2015) 948–954 9534. Conclusion
Our research question was: how did the ICEM perceive and
impact oil and gas workers unions’ capacities to represent workers
in TNCs operating in Kazakhstan? The question of perception may
be answered fairly simply: the ICEM perceived them as essentially
soviet-style unions which emphasised elite political activity in
preference to developing mobilising capacities. The speciﬁcities
referred to by Buketov (2014) may be principally related to their
roots in Kazakh society. The further question nevertheless remains
of how far the GUF’s perceptions were justiﬁed by the evidence.
One response might be that all of the problems identiﬁed with the
Kazakh unions would have been applicable at least at an equivalent
point in their development to many other unions, for example in
Azerbaijan. They had been prepared on at least one occasion to take
a bargaining stance with the Canadians, they had enjoyed some
success through political action and they had (after an initial naı¨ve
mis-perception that they would affect independent unions rather
than their own) opposed negative legal changes. However, the
2007 workshop revealed that the Kazakh unions demonstrated
little interest in undertaking fundamental reform. The answer to
the second part of the question is less problematic: GUF
interventions have only minimally affected their capacity to
mobilise workers.
In mid-2014 the Kazakh unions remain largely unreformed.
The ‘Soviet’ nature of the ofﬁcial unions is broadly similar to that
of unions in the ‘transitional periphery’ more widely. Most of
these unions appear locked into broader polities that constitute
hostile environments for organising forms of trade unionism.
Meanwhile, Kazakh unions have been involved in a desperate
rearguard action to defend their rights to operate in the political
and legal arenas and this has proved highly distracting to their
expressed wish to embark on reform. As the GUFs prosecute
their activities in TNCs in the Russian-speaking world, these
unions remain marginal to them. As Cooley (2005) notes in
relation to other international institutions’ such as the
international ﬁnancial institutions and international NGOs’
interventions in Central Asia, national speciﬁcities meant that
they had little or no impact even if in the GUF case they avoided
major investments.
The experience allows reﬂection on the expectations generat-
ed by the notion of a ‘global system’. Unions internationally are
very heterogeneous in their functions, which do not necessarily
include organising, mobilising workers or bargaining. Thus, the
existence of a GFA such as that between Lukoil, ROGWU and the
ICEM cannot be seen as making such an approach more likely in
Central Asia. More importantly, any global system of industrial
relations is unlikely to achieve comprehensive coverage within
key TNCs and, while international in scope, may not fully justify
the ‘global’ description. Thus, the signiﬁcance of the GUFs as
actors in building any ‘global system’ will be limited. Experience
in Eastern Europe has shown that external intervention is
required; GUFs, because of their unique expertise, are capable
of leading projects to change this situation. However, several
preconditions would have to be met: ﬁrst, that the unions are
willing and ready to make major strategic changes in their
organisation and indeed their entire collective thinking via long-
term projects; second, that the GUFs agree that this is the case;
third, that the GUFs have adequate resources available to
undertake the major initiatives required. The latter condition
would require major changes in their human resources and
funding models that it would be difﬁcult for funders and key
afﬁliates to deliver and which appear unlikely to be met in the
near future. In short, the decline of trade union resources in the
developed world has serious wider consequences for worker
representation internationally.References
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